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ABSTRACT 
In 1978, Argentina and Chile were poised at the brink of war over disputed possession of 
the Beagle Channel islands located near the southern tip of South America. Despite 
provocative military maneuvering and inflammatory rhetoric from both sides, 
Argentina’s ruling military junta pulled back just short of attacking the territory occupied 
by Chile, and eventually both sides reached a peaceful settlement. 
Only four years later, Argentina launched a surprise invasion of the British-held 
Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic. Why did Argentina choose to go to war with 
Britain in 1982, but not with Chile in 1978? What factors led to a grab for the Falklands 
instead of the Beagle Channel islands? 
Prospect theory, borrowed from cognitive psychology, may hold the answer. This 
theory proposes that decision-makers tend to be more risk-averse when they are facing a 
potential gain and more willing to take risks when they are confronting a potential loss. 
Therefore, the junta refrained from invading the Beagle Channel islands because they 
were more secure in their political position and therefore facing a potential gain, but 
chose to invade the Falklands because they were insecure in their position and facing the 
loss of political power. 
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, Argentina and Chile were poised at the brink of war over disputed 
possession of the Beagle Channel islands. Both countries were under military government 
and highly disinclined to yield anything to their geopolitical rivals. Despite provocative 
military maneuvering and inflammatory rhetoric, both sides backed down and eventually 
reached a peaceful settlement. 
Only four years later, however, the same Argentine military junta launched a 
surprise invasion of the British-held Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic, which 
Argentina has historically claimed.1 Why did Argentina choose to go to war with Britain 
in 1982 but not with Chile in 1978? What factors led to a grab for the Falklands but not 
the Beagle Channel islands?  
This thesis will answer these questions by examining the decision-making process 
of the Argentine military leadership in both conflicts. The difference in outcomes in these 
conflicts can be explained by a decision-making concept called “prospect theory” 
borrowed from cognitive psychology. 
1. Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory presents an alternative to the traditional rational choice analysis 
of decision-making. Whereas in rational choice theory, people are assumed to always 
calculate the benefits and costs of their actions and make the decision that results in 
maximum personal advantage, prospect theory claims that people will take different 
approaches to risk, depending on whether they are facing a potential loss or a potential 
gain. When making decisions that attempt to maximize personal gain, people tend to be 
                                                
1 These islands are customarily known as the Falkland Islands in English, and as las Islas Malvinas in 
Spanish. For simplicity’s sake, this thesis will generally refer to them as the Falklands. This is not meant as 
a statement of support for the sovereignty claims of any state. 
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more cautious when in the domain of gains, and more willing to take risks when in the 
domain of losses.  
Kurt Weyland applied prospect theory to neoliberal economic reform in four 
South American states in his work entitled “The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile 
Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela.” This passage from Weyland helps 
to illustrate the point: 
The following two choice situations provide examples of risk aversion in 
the domain of gains, and risk acceptance in the domain of losses. In the 
first situation, people are asked to choose between a sure gain of $100 or a 
lottery that offers 50 percent chance of winning $220 and a 50 percent 
chance of no gain. In this choice between different options of gains, two-
thirds to three quarters of experimental subjects display risk aversion and 
select the safe option of $100. Since the lottery has higher expected 
value—namely, $110—these people make an excessively cautious choice, 
which diverges from strict cost-benefit calculations. Thus, they do not act 
in a conventionally rational fashion. In the second situation, people are 
asked to choose between a sure loss of $100 or a lottery that holds a 50 
percent chance of losing $220 and a 50 percent chance of no loss. In this 
choice between different options of losses, two-thirds to three quarters of 
experimental subjects display risk acceptance and select the lottery, 
hoping to avoid any loss. Since the lottery has lower expected value—
namely, –$110 compared to the –$100 of the sure loss—all these people 
make an excessively daring choice, which again diverges from 
conventionally rational calculations. The fact that depending on domain, 
experimental subjects switch between pronounced risk aversion and clear 
risk acceptance poses a particular challenge to expected utility arguments.2 
This means of studying how decision-makers perceive risk and how it affects their 
choices can be utilized to solve the puzzle of the junta. Governmental leaders who seeks 
to maximize their personal benefits will generally be primarily motivated by the desire to 
maintain their position of power. Therefore, according to prospect theory, we may expect 
them to change their risk-acceptance levels depending on the type of situation that they 
are facing, and how secure they feel in their position. If the leaders are firmly rooted in 
power, they are likely to view themselves in the domain of gains, and will therefore act 
with a greater aversion to risk. Conversely, if the leaders are insecure and clutching to a 
                                                
2 Kurt Weyland, The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and 
Venezuela (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 40–1. 
 3 
tenuous hold on power, they are likely to view themselves in the domain of losses, and 
will therefore be more willing to take a riskier action in order to have a chance to “break 
even.” 
This paper will argue that prospect theory can explain the differing actions of the 
junta members in 1978 and 1982. When the junta was confronting Chile over the Beagle 
Channel islands in 1978, they had seized power relatively recently and were still in the 
early phase of their rule. Therefore they felt more secure in their positions (in the domain 
of gains) and were less inclined to take a risky gamble. In contrast, by 1982, the junta was 
in a dire political position and facing severe challenges to their regime. They felt less 
secure in their positions (in the domain of losses) and were more willing to consider a 
risky course of action that carried the promise of a potential large gain to recover from 
their grim situation. Therefore, they pulled back from an invasion of the Beagle Channel 
islands in 1978, but gambled on a grab for the Falkland Islands in 1982. 
2. Outline 
Chapter I will discuss the relationship of territorial disputes and war, and give 
historical background for both conflicts. It will also provide an overview of the Argentine 
political system in the second half of the twentieth century, most notably as it relates to 
the governance of the military junta in the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (PRN), 
from March 1976 until December 1983. Chapter II will analyze the dispute over 
sovereignty between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel islands, and the 
eventual decision by the junta to refrain from armed force and pursue a negotiated 
settlement. Chapter III will analyze the dispute over sovereignty between Argentina and 
Great Britain over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, and the eventual decision taken by the 
junta to resort to armed force. Chapter IV will compare and contrast the two historical 
episodes and analyze the differences that resulted in divergent outcomes, as well as 
examine alternate explanations and potential applications to other territorial disputes. 
 4 
B. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AS A CAUSE OF WAR 
Territorial disputes can very quickly lead nations into violent conflict. Few things 
can generate stronger waves of burning nationalism and fierce anger than the injustice of 
feeling that a piece of your sovereign territory, a portion of your beloved motherland, has 
been cruelly and unjustly stolen from you by a bitter rival. Even if the territory in 
question does not have significant value, or if its value is substantially less than the costs 
of going to war, land has the tendency to trigger strong sentiments of national pride and 
prestige. Many wars are prompted or escalated by some form of a territorial dispute. In 
fact, it is somewhat difficult to think of an example of a war in the modern era that did 
not include a dispute over territory as a primary or proximate cause.  Political scientist 
John Vasquez has conducted numerous quantitative studies that indicate states that are 
involved in territorial disputes are significantly more likely to go to war than states that 
are involved in disputes for non-territorial issues.3  
1. Prior Research 
Numerous authors have written about the twin phenomena of territorial disputes 
and war. Huth points to “the strategic location of bordering territory.”4 Similarly, Rasler 
and Thompson illustrate the importance of territory that “promotes access to a place that 




                                                
3 For example, see: John A. Vasquez. “Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do 
Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War.” International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol.40, Issue 4, (December 1996), 531–558. 
John A. Vasquez, “The Probability of War, 1816–1992.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 
1 (March 2004), 1–27. 
John A. Vasquez. “Mapping the Probability of War and Analyzing the Possibility of Peace: the Role of 
Territorial Disputes.” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2001. 145–174. 
4 Paul K. Huth, 1996. “Enduring Rivalries and Territorial Disputes, 1950–1990.” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 1996), 16. 
5 Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson. 2006. “Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and 
Conflict Escalation.” International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 50, No. 1, March), 146. 
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have both concluded that states that are contiguous are much more likely to resort to 
violence.6 Simmons states “territory involving resources is especially difficult to 
relinquish.”7  
Hensel makes the unique observation that “although other issue types may be 
salient for their tangible attributes (e.g., economic or resource issues) or for their 
intangible dimension (e.g., prestige or influence), few issues besides territory appear 
likely to take on high values on both dimensions.”8 Kocs identifies that violence is more 
likely in situations in which the sides involved have never previously reached an 
agreement but have instead formally and consistently disputed the territory.9 Finally, 
Huth identifies that the lack of democratic leadership is a key indicator of conflicts that 
progress to violence.10 
Geopolitical thinking has deep roots in Latin America, and especially in the 
southern cone. Although geopolitics has fallen out of favor in Europe and other areas of 
the world following World War II, it has persisted and even thrived in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile. Brazilian theorists developed the concept of the “living frontier” by which a 
state functions like a living organism that can grow and expand. In a continent where the 
vast majority of the population lives near the coastal perimeter, there is a sizable amount 
of “empty space” in the sparsely populated interior. This has naturally prompted 
expansion, especially in remote regions where borders are not clearly defined. Brazil has 
traditionally been focused on its quest to become the continental superpower, and has 
obtained much interior land at the expense of its neighbors since achieving its  
 
                                                
6 Vasquez, Distinguishing Rivals, 555. 
Cameron G. Thies. 2001. “Territorial Nationalism in Spatial Rivalries: An Institutionalist Account of 
the Argentine-Chilean Rivalry.” International Interactions Vol. 27, Issue 4, 425. 
7 Beth A. Simmons. 2002. “Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and 
Territorial Disputes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution (Vol. 46, No. 6, December), 846. 
8 Paul R. Hensel. 2001. “Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial 
Claims in the Americas, 1816–1992.” International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 45, No. 1, March 2001), 85. 
9 Steven A. Kocs. 1995. “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945–1987.” The Journal of Politics 
(Vol. 57, No. 1, February 1995), 163. 
10 Huth, Enduring Rivalries, 15. 
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independence. As the primary historic rival to Brazilian growth and power, Argentina has 
been especially wary of Brazilian territorial expansion, as well as their Chilean 
neighbors.11 
2. Islands 
Islands offer an especially prevalent lightning rod for territorial disputes all over 
the world. They can serve as an anchor for extensive maritime claims, which can bring 
economic gains through control over fishing zones and the potential for undersea natural 
resources. Islands that are strategically located can also create natural choke points, 
which can be utilized for naval defense or to control trade. Some of the most virulent 
disputes that are still hotly contested today are those involving islands. Most people 
around the world are familiar with at least a few of the following examples of islands 
whose status is still disputed: Senkaku, Liancourt (Dokdo, Takeshima), San Andres y 
Providencia, Serranilla, Sapodilla, Navassa, Rockall, Spratly, Paracels, Kurils, Calero, 
Conejo, South Georgia, South Sandwich, and the Falklands.  
 
                                                
11 Jack Child. 1985. Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors. N.Y: 
Praeger, 23, 36–39. 
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Figure 1.   Southern Cone of South America, including Falkland Islands and South 
Georgia Island. (From Google Maps, 2011)12 
C. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN LATIN AMERICA 
1. Colonial Roots 
After the discovery of the Americas in the late fifteenth century, Spain took on the 
enormous endeavor of conquering and governing an entire continent. To approach this 
monumental challenge of administration, Spain divided up the new territories into large 
viceroyalties, which were then ruled by a regally appointed viceroy. However, the scanty 
amount of actual exploration that had been conducted, as well as technological 
limitations of the time, meant that the borders between the viceroyalties were not always 
precisely delineated.  
To a degree, this was not considered particularly important, because all the 
territory in the New World besides Brazil initially belonged to Spain, regardless of which 
                                                
12 Google Maps, http://maps.google.com, accessed 14 September 2011. 
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viceroyalty it was in. The Spanish added new viceroyalties as they continued their 
expansion through South America, and the boundaries became more precise. However, in 
areas that were especially inhospitable or inaccessible, such as the Andes mountain range 
or the Amazon jungle, lines were still rather arbitrary and nebulous at best.  
2. Post Independence 
This created difficulties after the wave of Latin American revolution and 
independence in the early nineteenth century, because now new nation-states were being 
formed whose international borders were not clearly established. Most of the new 
countries had some portion of their borders that consisted of thick jungle or towering 
mountains, making it difficult to determine where respective sovereignty began and 
ended.  
The general consensus among the new nation-states was to use the principle of uti 
possidetis to allow the dividing lines between the former Spanish viceroyalties to become 
the new international boundaries. Generally speaking, this budding international norm 
simplified the problem of borders, avoided most pitfalls of terra nullius, and likely 
prevented a great deal of conflict and disputes over borders. However, it was still of 
limited use in the inaccessible areas, and therefore some degree of terra nullius did still 
exist.13 
This became a source of conflict in nearly every part of the New World that had 
been controlled by Spain and Portugal, from Mexico to Patagonia. Many of the disputes 
were quite bloody and enduring; portions of the mountainous border between Peru and 
Ecuador were not resolved until 1995, after the two countries had already come to blows 
over the territory three times. As in countless other parts of the world, islands were a 
never-ending source of conflict and overlapping claims. 
                                                
13 Thies, Territorial Nationalism, 409. 
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3. The Patagonian Quarrel 
Of particular relevance to relations between Argentina and Chile was the question 
of Patagonia, the sparsely populated and inhospitable area of southernmost South 
America. Both countries claimed the whole of the region, and it was not until 1881 that 
they agreed that Argentina would possess the larger portion east of the Andes, while 
Chile would be left with the smaller western portion. Argentina was able to achieve this 
geopolitical success through an excellent example of hard-nosed and timely negotiations. 
Chile was fully engaged in fighting the War of the Pacific against the combined forces of 
Peru and Bolivia, and Argentina compelled Chile to renounce all claims to eastern 
Patagonia in exchange for an agreement not to join the alliance. Chile could not have 
maintained a two-front war against the three other nations, and felt they had no choice but 
to acquiesce. Nevertheless, a feeling that Argentina had stolen territory that should 
rightfully be Chilean would persist for some time thereafter.14  
The Treaty of 1881 made provisions to split the large island of Tierra del Fuego, 
which lies off the southern tip of the South American mainland. Chile was given 
possession of the western half while Argentina retained possession of the eastern half. 
The treaty also endeavored to resolve all territorial disputes at the extreme southern end 
of the continent by agreeing that all islands that lie to the south of the Beagle Channel 
belong to Chile. This granted to Chile a number of islands such as Navarino, Hoste, and a 
variety of smaller islands extending all the way south to the famous but incredibly 
inhospitable Cabo de Hornos (Cape Horn).15  
Despite the agreement over Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego, many territorial 
disputes still existed between Argentina and Chile, especially along the 3,300 mile 
serpentine border (third longest in the world) formed by the Andes along nearly the entire 
length of both countries. Fortunately for prospects of peace in the southern cone, the 
groundbreaking Pactos de Mayo of 1902 resolved a large number of these disputes, 
                                                
14 David R. Mares. 2001. Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America. New 
York. Columbia University Press, 133; Child, 78. 
15 Thomas E. Princen. 1988. Intermediary intervention: A model of intervention and a study of the 
Beagle Channel case. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University, 101–102. 
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especially along the central mountain range.  Even more encouragingly, they agreed upon 
a mechanism by which they would resolve future conflicts. The terms of the agreement 
were that the British Crown, who was assumed to be a neutral third party in such matters, 
would arbitrate any further territorial disputes between the two countries. Presumably, 
this would eliminate any further threat of war over the question of territory, since the 
method of legal and peaceful resolution was clearly established.16  
The Pactos de Mayo also contained the first official mention of the so-called 
“bioceanic principle,” which was (and is) the centerpiece of Argentina’s foreign policy 
towards Chile. This statement represents Argentina’s belief that they are, by their very 
nature, an Atlantic nation, while Chile, likewise by nature, is a Pacific nation. Although 
this is merely a general statement and not legally binding in any specific sense, Argentina 
has attempted to use it as a foundation for their claims in territorial disputes with Chile.17   
 
                                                
16 Mares, Violent Peace, 133; Thies, Territorial Nationalism, 415. 
17 David R. Mares. 1998. “The Historical Utility of an Ambiguous Concept.” Strategic Balance and 
Confidence Building Measures in the Americas. Joseph S. Tulchin, Francisco Rojas Aravena, and Ralph 




Figure 2.   Beagle Channel and nearby islands (From Google Earth, 2011)18 
D. THE BEAGLE CHANNEL CONFLICT 
The Beagle Channel is a body of water that separates the Argentine portion of the 
large island of Tierra del Fuego from Chile’s Navarino Island, as seen in Figure 2. It 
continues west to the Pacific and provides a narrow connection between the two oceans, 
but its most important function is to delineate the southeastern border between the 
countries as per the terms of the Treaty of 1881. The Treaty clearly states that all islands 
south of the Beagle Channel belong to Chile, and Argentina has never challenged that. 
They do, however, challenge what the actual path of the Beagle Channel is.19 
                                                
18 Google Earth software application, utilized 14 September 2011. 
19 David R. Struthers. 1985. The Beagle Channel Dispute Between Argentina and Chile: An Historical 
Analysis. Defense Intelligence College: Washington, D.C. Defense Technical Information Center Press, 34. 
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As seen in Figure 3, the three islands named Picton, Nueva, and Lennox (PNL) lie 
at the eastern mouth of the Beagle Channel as it opens into the Atlantic Ocean. Chile 
interpreted the Treaty of 1881 to mean that the Beagle Channel continues its path to the 
east past the PNL islands to Cape San Pio, meaning that the islands would lie south of the 
channel and belong to Chile. Argentina countered with the rather bizarre claim that the 
course of the channel actually bends sharply to the south after passing Navarino Island, 
leaving the PNL islands to the east, meaning that they would belong to Argentina.20 To 
understand why Argentina would go to such cartographic contortions for the sake of three 
small, uninhabited islands at the end of the world, it is necessary to explain the potential 
implications that possession of the PNL islands would have. 
 
Figure 3.   Differing Interpretations of the Path of the Beagle Channel (From Struthers, 
1985)21 
                                                
20 Princen, Intermediary intervention, 103. 
21 Struthers, Beagle Channel Dispute, 26. 
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1. The Lure of the South Atlantic 
To geopolitically-minded Argentines, the South Atlantic should rightfully be their 
private lake, and anything in or under it should, likewise, be their property. Ever since the 
British took possession of the Falkland Islands in 1833, Argentina has burned at the 
indignity of losing these lands a mere 250 miles off their coast, and continually vows to 
recover them.22 This has also made them rather sensitive to any other potential threat to 
their sovereignty in the South Atlantic or any challenge to their role as the “keeper of the 
doorway” between the Atlantic and the Pacific.23 This historic vision has been updated 
by resource issues. The South Atlantic is rich in fish and krill, and it was believed that 
large offshore oil deposits could exist there as well.24 Their claims in the South Atlantic 
are also the main basis for their claim to a segment of Antarctica, so losing the first could 
also eliminate the second. 
This is where the PNL islands become significant. Before the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was finalized in 1982, there was no 
universally recognized limit to the maritime possession zone that a country could claim 
from its landmass. A country could potentially claim 200 miles of territorial waters from 
even a small island.25 Therefore, if Chile had undisputed possession of the PNL islands, 
they could claim a large stretch of the South Atlantic, cutting a wide swath through 
Argentina’s aspirations of control and putting a wall between them and Antarctica. 
Clearly, this eventuality was entirely unacceptable to Argentina, and they felt they needed 
to do whatever they could to prevent it.26  
                                                
22 Thies, Territorial Nationalism, 409. 
23 Child, Geopolitics and Conflict, 45. 
24 J. L. Garrett. 1985. “The Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern 
Cone.” Journal of International American Studies (Vol. 27, Issue 3), 84. 
25 Thies, Territorial Nationalism, 416. 
26 Garrett, Beagle Channel Dispute, 84. 
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2. Arbitration 
Argentina attempted bilateral negotiations with Chile, but the countries were 
unable to resolve their differences. Chile refused to accept Argentina’s proposed course 
change of the Beagle Channel that would leave the PNL islands on the Argentine side.27 
Therefore, in accordance with the terms of the Pactos de Mayo, they submitted the matter 
to arbitration by the British crown in 1971, with one alteration. By that time, Argentina 
was feeling less inclined to trust the impartiality of Britain, due to the increasing strain 
placed on their relationship by the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. Both countries 
consequently agreed for the judgment to be made by five jurists from the UN 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) who would form a special Court of Arbitration, with 
the British Queen only able to accept or reject their findings, but not modify them in any 
way.28 
 
Figure 4.   The Falkland Islands (From Google Maps, 2011)29 
                                                
27 Struthers, Beagle Channel Dispute, 61. 
28 Child, Geopolitics and Conflict, 80. 
29 Google Maps, http://maps.google.com, accessed 14 September 2011. 
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E. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 
The Falkland/Malvinas Islands are a small archipelago in the South Atlantic that 
lie approximately 250 miles from the coast of Argentina. They are very desolate and 
isolated, and nothing remains of any indigenous inhabitants. Although the first recorded 
sighting was in 1540, there were no attempts to colonize the islands until the French 
established the settlement of Port Louis in 1764. The British founded their own 
settlement at Saunders Island two years later. The French soon agreed to cede their claim 
to their Spanish allies, and militarized conflict arose between the Spanish and British over 
conflicting claims. The European powers stopped short of going to war, and eventually 
both countries abandoned their settlements—the British in 1774 and the Spanish in 1811. 
However, both countries maintained their claim to the islands and left behind plaques 
asserting their respective sovereignty.30  
When Argentina achieved independence from Spain in 1816, they claimed all 
territorial rights of Spain in the area. Clearly, Britain and Argentina differed in opinion as 
to whether this included the Falklands or not, but the matter did not generate much 
attention until 1829. The British were prompted to lodge a formal protest when Argentina 
established an outpost on the islands and even named an official governor, but took no 
action against them and did not appear likely to do so at the time.31 
1. The Islands Are Lost 
Unfortunately for Argentine sovereignty claims, the appointed governor, Louis 
Vernet, was perhaps overly vigorous in his efforts to establish recognition of Argentine 
sovereignty in the area. He began to use the military presence of the outpost to assert 
Argentine rights over the fishing areas, and in 1831 seized three American fishing vessels 
when he deemed that they were violating Argentine fishing rights. The United States did 
not take kindly to this action against their citizens, and the captain of warship USS 
Lexington, which happened to be nearby, took it upon himself to launch a punitive 
                                                
30 Lawrence Freedman. 2005. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign. Vol 1: The Origins of 
the Falklands War. New York, NY. Taylor & Francis, Inc., 5–6. 
31 Freedman, Official History, 7. 
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expedition. The Lexington destroyed the outpost, seized all trade goods, and arrested the 
Argentines. They sailed away and left the islands uninhabited, declaring them res nullius, 
lands not under control of any state.32 
Seizing the opportunity, the British quickly sent two warships to reclaim the 
islands and establish a new colony in 1833, and they have maintained physical control of 
the islands from that point forward. Argentina has vigorously protested this state of 
affairs ever since, but did not militarily contest British control until 1982. Nevertheless, 
the loss of the islands has not ceased to rankle, and the indignity of their violated 
sovereignty still burns fiercely. Generations of Argentine schoolchildren have grown up 
being taught that las Islas Malvinas are rightfully Argentine, and that one day they will 
be reclaimed from the foreign oppressor.  
2. A Powerful Symbol 
Argentina has spent many years attempting to rally global support for their claim 
to the Falklands, generally by portraying them as a holdover of the colonial era that 
should be returned to the country from which they were stolen. They achieved some 
success with this approach, especially during the widespread anti-colonial sentiment that 
pervaded the world following World War II. In fact, in 1964, the United Nations added 
the Falkland Islands to their list of “Territories that Ought to be Decolonized.”33 Britain 
initially used the islands as coaling stations for their navy, but since naval propulsion 
technology has progressed beyond the need for coal, the islands are not the valuable 
outposts that they once were. Questions have been raised in the British halls of 
government of whether or not these distant and sparsely populated islands with few 
natural resources are worth the sizable expense of maintaining and administering them.  
                                                
32 Fritz L. Hoffman and Olga Mingo Hoffman. 1984. Sovereignty in Dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 
1493–1982. Boulder, CO. Westview Press, 72–74. 
33 Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. 1991. Signals of War: The Falklands 
Conflict of 1982. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 7. 
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F. ARGENTINE POLITICS FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II 
Irredentism is very strong in Argentina. Despite the country’s territorial gains at 
the expense of Paraguay in 1870 and Chile in 1881, the sense of a geopolitical victim 
mentality still persists. This has played a major role in domestic Argentine politics, as 
presidential candidates and military juntas alike have been able to “play the Malvinas 
card” in their speeches to stir up nationalism in the population.  
In 1966, the government of Argentina was overthrown by a military coup, their 
fifth in the twentieth century.34 Successful military coups in 1930, 1943, 1955, and 1962 
(as well as a handful that failed because they were only conducted by a small segment of 
the military) had set a clear precedent for military intervention. General Juan Carlos 
Onganía led the 1966 Revolución Argentina coup that toppled the civilian government of 
Arturo Illia, only to be ousted in turn after he failed to control the strikes and general 
unrest that was beginning to rear its head. With Perón exiled and his Partido Justicialista 
(PJ) party banned, a sizable percentage of Argentines found themselves without a 
sanctioned political voice, and therefore they expressed their frustrations in unsanctioned 
ways. General Roberto Levingston took over as President in 1970, offered no 
improvement, and was promptly overthrown in turn by General Alejandro Lanusse in 
1971.35  
Lanusse prepared to continue the military-civilian cycle by preparing for a new 
round of elections, but attempted to appease the unrest and increase the legitimacy of the 
electoral process by publically acknowledging that peronismo was an unavoidable reality 
of Argentine politics. Lanusse made way for another return to democracy in 1973, and 
Perón and the PJ regained control of the Casa Rosada.36 However, this stretch was even 
more short-lived and tumultuous than usual, with the country cycling through four 
civilian presidents in three years. By the time the utterly unqualified Isabel Perón, a 
                                                
34 Deborah L. Norden. 1996. Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 39. 
35 Juan Carlos Torre and Liliana de Riz. “Argentina since 1946.” Translated by Elizabeth Ladd. In 
Argentina Since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 299–
310. 
36 Torre and de Riz, Argentina since 1946, 310-314 
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former cabaret dancer who took office upon her husband Juan Perón’s death, had nearly 
run the country into the ground, the nation was actually grateful when the military retook 
control in March 1976.37  
General Jorge Videla led the PRN military junta until March 1981 and 
relinquished power to General Roberto Viola. Any real stability appeared to leave office 
with Videla, however, as Viola was ousted after only nine months in office. After some 
shuffling and the short interim presidency of Admiral Carlos Lacoste, General Leopoldo 
Galtieri was able to outmaneuver his military rivals and obtain the seat of power in late 
December 1981.38 
1. Relative Security 
Despite Argentina’s long pattern of contentious and intermittent military rule, the 
PRN junta attained reasonably regime security in the early years of their rule. When the 
PRN took power, violent guerrilla movements gripped the country, and the military took 
all available measures to counter them. The late 1970s witnessed the most horrific 
atrocities of the Guerra Sucia (Dirty War), as the military government tortured and killed 
thousands of suspected subversives. The guerrilla movements could not withstand the 
onslaught of the state’s repressive organs, and were all but eradicated by 1977. After the 
guerrilla threat was crushed, the regime began to receive a great deal of domestic and 
international pressure over their human rights abuses, but it did not appear that any 
movement was capable of removing the military from power.39  
                                                
37 Daniel Poneman. 1987. Argentina: Democracy on Trial. New York, NY: Paragon House, 32–33. 
 Nathan A. Haverstock. 2008. “Leading Ladies of Latin America.” Americas (Vol. 60, No. 6, 
November–December 2008), 48. 
38 Paul H. Lewis. 2002. Guerrillas and Generals: The “Dirty War” in Argentina. Westport, CT. 
Praeger Publishers, 181. 
39 Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 159–161; Norden, Military Rebellion, 68. 
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G. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Garrett and Mares40 provide a thorough diplomatic history leading up to the 
Beagle Channel conflict, with Child, Thies, Dominguez41, and Meza42 also highlighting 
key background elements. Garrett describes the Chilean-Argentine Treaty of 1855, in 
which both countries agreed to abide by the original Spanish boundaries between the 
former colonies, in accordance with the frequently invoked principal of uti possedetis. 
Since everyone was aware that the Spanish had been occasionally lax with their maps and 
the demarcations were not always clear, both parties also agreed to submit all territorial 
disputes to third-party arbitration and not attempt to resolve them militarily. Garrett and 
Mares both discuss the Treaty of 1881, in which Argentina was successful in negotiating 
the undisputed possession of eastern Patagonia in exchange for non-interference in the 
War of the Pacific, which Chile was fighting against Peru and Bolivia.  
Garrett, Child, Thies, Meza, and Mares all emphasize the groundbreaking Pactos 
de Mayo of 1902, which resolved all territorial disputes along their extensive Andean 
border, and specifically named the British crown as official arbiter of all unresolved 
disputes. This was a key clause because quite a number of disputes still remained in the 
sparsely populated extreme south of the continent. Additionally, the Pactos included an 
arms limitation treaty that halted a warship race between the neighbors, and contained the 
first mention of the oft-quoted “bioceanic principal,” namely, “Chile belongs in the 
Pacific, and Argentina belongs in the Atlantic.” The problem, as Child illustrates, is that, 
because both countries see themselves as the “keeper of the doorway” between Atlantic 
and Pacific, the Beagle Channel is a point of friction. Thies points out that both countries 
also share a self-perception of victimization through previous territorial losses, especially 
                                                
40 Mares, Historical Utility, 139–157. 
41 Jorge I. Dominguez. 2007. “International Cooperation in Latin America: The Design of Regional 
Institutions by Slow Accretion.” Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative 
Perspectives. Amitav Acharya, Alastair Iain Johnston (eds) Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 83–128. 
42 Miguel Navarro Meza. 1998. “A Chilean Perspective on Strategic Balance.” Strategic Balance and 
Confidence Building Measures in the Americas. Joseph S. Tulchin, Francisco Rojas Aravena, and Ralph 
Espach (eds). Washington, D.C; Stanford, Calif: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford University Press. 
24–46. 
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Chile’s aforementioned “loss” of eastern Patagonia, and what Argentina views as 
Britain’s blatant colonial seizure of the Falklands in 1833. The fact that both countries 
also acquired major territories from northern neighbors following nineteenth century wars 
did little to salve their wounded national pride. 
The importance of the PNL islands is described by Child, Neville43, Garrett, 
Rasler and Thompson, and Infante Caffi.44 By themselves, the PNL islands were just 
three small uninhabited and inhospitable rocks near the southern tip of the world, but 
their position outside the eastern end of the Beagle Channel meant that whichever 
country owned them could potentially claim a 200 mile maritime possession zone around 
them. If Chile (who was already in de facto possession of the islands) made such a claim 
official, it would slice deep through the middle of Argentina’s claims in the South 
Atlantic and Antarctic, which was profoundly unacceptable.  
Alternatively, Poneman believes that the PNL islands were not particularly 
significant, and that the Argentine public never had the strong nationalist feelings toward 
them as they did towards the Falklands. Even many Argentine maps showed the PNL 
islands as belonging to Chile, and he quotes President Juan Peron as saying a decade 
earlier that the islands “were not worth fighting for and might just as well be 
dynamited.”45 
In either case, Argentina had been ruled by a hard-line military junta since 1976, 
and when the result of third-party arbitration by the Queen ruled in favor of Chile in 
1977, Argentina rejected the arbitration and made preparations for an invasion to seize 
the contested islands. On December 22, 1978, Argentina launched Operación Soberanía 
(Operation Sovereignty) to seize multiple Chilean-held islands in the area, only to call off 
the assault before any of the forces reached their destinations. The reason they did so has 
various interpretations. 
                                                
43 Santiago Ricardo Neville. Potential for Conflict in South America (Masters’ thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1988) Monterey, Calif: Naval Postgraduate School. 
44 Maria Teresa Infante Caffi. 1984. “Argentina y Chile: Percepciones del conflicto de la zona del 
Beagle.” Estudios Internacionales, Vol.17, Issue 67 (July–September 1984): 337–358. 
45 Poneman, Democracy on Trial, 144. 
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Waisman states “an attempt to trigger a conflict with Chile in ‘78 was thwarted by 
international pressure.”46 Mares points out that Chile had clearly expressed their 
willingness to fight to retain the islands, and that their formidable Navy was well-
prepared and positioned in the region. Aravena credits the political-military dialogue of 
the military presidents Pinochet and Videla for opening enough space for the last minute 
offer of mediation by the Pope to be accepted, also adding that “rationality prevailed.”47 
Garrett believes that the Argentine junta did not originally plan to attack, but did not feel 
that they could back down from their bellicose threats once negotiations and arbitration 
failed to resolve the dispute. Fortunately, the Pope’s urgent offer to mediate gave the 
junta a diplomatic off-ramp without losing face in the eyes of the Chileans or (more 
importantly) their own population. 
Less than four years later, Argentina launched a surprise invasion of the long-
coveted Falkland Islands. Faced with a rapidly deteriorating economy and a public that 
was growing increasingly discontent with military rule after the excesses of the Guerra 
Sucia, the junta was in a difficult position and badly needed a dramatic unifying event to 
boost their domestic popularity. Waisman believes that the junta had learned from the 
Beagle Channel dispute that the prospect of “liberating” a claimed national territory was 
the best possible way to do this.48 
Several other factors made the Falklands a more inviting target than the PNL 
islands. Norden points out that ever since the 1940s, all Argentines have been taught from 
childhood that the Falklands are theirs by inalienable right and that someday they will be 
returned to the mother country.49 The Falklands are in a highly strategic location, and 
their possession would enable Argentina to lay claim to a vast expanse of the resource-
rich South Atlantic; Simmons’ study identifies that territories rich in natural resources 
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naturally incite the most conflict.50 However, Hensel describes the “intangible” value of 
lands that are seen as “a part of the national identity,” and that the psychological 
significance of the Falklands to Argentina strongly outweighs any desire for their 
resources.51  
Another advantage to making a play for the Falklands was that they were 
commonly perceived worldwide as a holdover from the colonial era. General Galtieri, the 
leader of the junta from December 1981 until June 1982, therefore believed that as long 
as the invasion was successfully completed with minimal casualties, the UN would treat 
it as a fait accompli, strongly decry any further military action, and demand concessions 
from both sides. In another misjudgment that seems incredibly naïve in retrospect, there 
is significant evidence that Galtieri believed that Washington would support an Argentine 
seizure of the Falklands, or at least remain neutral.52 Alternatively, Bidegaín claims that 
some Argentines believed that the U.S. and Great Britain had plans to declare the 
Falkland Islands as an independent state, and then to install a large military base on the 
islands.53 
Perhaps the largest incentive that led the junta to choose to invade the Falklands 
was the commonly held belief that Britain would not send their military to fight back. 
This assumption pervaded every level of the Argentine planning for the invasion, and it 
would cost them dearly. In their defense, this was not an entirely unreasonable thought; 
there were numerous reasons why a British military response was not assured. Norden 
suggests that the islands were of limited value to Britain, and discusses the enormous 
expense required to assemble a suitable task force to retake the islands so far distant from 
home waters. However, Wynia points out the strong domestic opposition to relinquishing 
the islands that that British government faced.54 Regardless of their actual material value, 
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they were considered to be sovereign British territory, and they were extremely reluctant 
to abandon them, especially to an antidemocratic military regime with a very poor human 
rights record. 
Nietzel gives a very comprehensive comparison of the military forces involved, 
which can be summarized by saying that Argentine ground troops were markedly inferior 
to their British equivalents, but that Argentina possessed a reasonable local naval parity 
and a notable air superiority, at least by number of available fixed wing combat aircraft. 
Fighting the war off their own coast also gave Argentina many logistical and tactical 
advantages. Additionally, the junta anticipated complete moral, political, and logistical 
support from all Western Hemisphere countries via the Organization of American States 
(OAS) and the Rio Treaty of Joint Interamerican Defense.  
All of these factors seemed to add up in the junta’s favor (although many of their 
assumptions would later prove to be disastrously inaccurate), and convinced them that an 
operation to retake the Falklands would be successful, and that it was just the thing to 
unite their heavily fractured population and maintain their own political power. It did 
have several advantages over a war with Chile over the PNL islands. First, although 
Britain had a more powerful military overall than Chile, the combination of British forces 
dispersed throughout the world and the tyranny of distance virtually guaranteed that even 
if they chose to fight, Argentina would ultimately be facing a small percentage of 
Britain’s full strength. Second, Chile had made it very clear that they were fully prepared 
and committed to defending the PNL islands, whereas Britain’s commitment was less 
easily ascertained. And finally, the desire to reclaim the Falklands is so deeply ingrained 
into every Argentine that regardless of any level of internal strife or discord, they would 
unite in a heartbeat behind any leader who was able to obtain them. 
In contrast, invading the PNL islands also had some factors in its favor. Chile has 
always been a significantly weaker military power than Britain, and the comparatively 
low value of the uninhabited small rocky islands might decrease the chances of a counter-
invasion. Likewise, one of the strongest arguments that Britain has consistently been able 
to offer in defense of their retention of the Falklands is the desire of the inhabitants, who 
have indicated by more than one referendum that they prefer to remain part of the United 
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Kingdom.55 The PNL islands are free from this unwanted complication precisely because 
they have no inhabitants. Finally, an impartial observer would find it difficult to 
realistically believe that the United States would not support its strongest NATO ally in 
any military conflict.  
A quantitative comparative case study performed by Vasquez indicates “it is rare 
for major states whose core territory is noncontiguous to fight a war one on one.”56 While 
noncontiguous wars certainly do occur, they tend to be wars fought between allied 
coalitions, not strictly one-on-one affairs. In order for noncontiguous states to engage in 
serious warfare, either one or both must possess a substantial expeditionary capacity. 
Neither Argentina nor Chile possesses this capability, but Britain does (albeit in a 
somewhat atrophied state). Based on this study, it would be far more likely for Argentina 
to fight a war with Chile, a major contiguous rival, than with Britain, who is not exactly a 
rival and is certainly not contiguous. However, a key consideration in this case is that 
Argentina chose to invade the Falklands precisely because they were not expecting to 
have to fight a war at all. 
Mares discusses the concept of “using military force as a bargaining tactic rather 
than a decision to settle an interstate dispute through war.”57 This has direct relevance in 
explaining the acts of the Argentine junta when confronting Chile and Britain, and he 
even devotes a chapter to militarized interstate bargaining in the case of the Beagle 
Channel islands. 
Also of interest, there is a sharp contrast between the aftermaths of both incidents; 
the dispute over the Falklands still rankles between Argentina and Britain today, but 
Argentina and Chile established excellent relations in the early 1990s when Chile 
returned to democracy. In fact, both governments made it a priority to eliminate any 
potential triggers for future wars based on territory, and through negotiation were able to 
resolve all 24 remaining border disputes that had persisted since their independence. 
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II. THE BEAGLE CHANNEL CONFLICT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The longstanding dissension over the rightful ownership of the Beagle Channel 
islands is a perfect case study of territorial conflict that developed into a full-fledged 
Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) out of all proportion to the apparent value of the 
territory under dispute. It is also an excellent example of a territorial conflict that was 
saved from the brink of war when it had appeared inevitable. It was perhaps the closest 
that South American nations had come to a major interstate war since the conclusion of 
the Chaco War in 1935. Both Chile and Argentina were under military rule, and both 
were aware that their continued legitimacy was dependent upon the perception of strength 
and commitment to the homeland. The Argentine junta came extremely close to 
culminating a military invasion of the disputed islands, but opted to pull back at the last 
minute. Chapter II will show that according to prospect theory, the junta in 1978 saw 
themselves in the domain of gains, and therefore were less willing to take the risk of a 
military land grab. 
This chapter will first discuss the arbitration results of the Beagle Channel 
dispute, along with a brief explanation of how the new junta came to be in power. Next 
will be a progression of events and escalation of the Beagle Channel crisis, and a 
description of the reasons why the junta chose to make the critical decisions that they did. 
Finally, this chapter will show how prospect theory can accurately explain these 
decisions, and close with a summary of how the conflict was ultimately resolved.  
1. Arbitration Considerations 
As discussed in Chapter I, both governments had agreed in 1971 to submit their 
dispute over the Beagle Channel islands to a special Court of Arbitration made up of five 
jurists from the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ). Queen Elizabeth II of England, 
as official arbiter, would deliver the final verdict. Under the terms of the arbitration, she 
was given the authority to approve or reject the findings of the court, but not to alter them 
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in any way. At the time of submitting the dispute for arbitration, Argentina was under the 
control of General Alejandro Lanusse and the Revolución Argentina junta, while Chile 
had just elected the Socialist president Salvador Allende.58 Both countries submitted 
mountains of historical documents and maps in an attempt to bolster their legal 
arguments for ownership.  
Figure 5 shows an example of a map from an Argentine source in 1985 that 
details what they believe the proper ownership of the extreme southern islands should be, 
claiming that the Beagle Channel ends before reaching the eastern shore of Navarino 
Island. The caption is very indicative of the views of the geopolitically minded 
Argentines, who were fearful of a Chilean foothold on the Atlantic. It reads:  
Given that the Beagle Channel ends at Point Navarro, the islands Picton, 
Lennox, Nueva, Terhalten, Sesambre, Evout, Barnevelt, Deceit, as well as 
Freycinet, Wollaston, and the Atlantic side of Herschel and Cape Horn, 
are all Argentine, since they do not lie ‘to the south’ of the aforementioned 
Channel. Additionally, they are Argentine because they are ‘bordering the 
Atlantic.’ The respective territorial seas and interior waters are also 
Argentine.59 
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Figure 5.   An Example of an Argentine Interpretation of the Boundary (From 
Strubbia, 1985)60 
                                                
60 Strubbia, Soberanía y justicia, 7. 
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The court considered numerous facets of the competing arguments. Primary 
emphasis was given to the description given in the Treaty of 1881, which both countries 
agreed was the document that governed the rightful placement of the border, and hence 
rightful ownership of the islands. Neither side challenged the legitimacy or authority of 
the Treaty of 1881, which specified that all islands to the south of the Beagle Channel 
belonged to Chile. The only matter that was disputed was what the exact course of the 
Beagle Channel was (see Figure 3). If the court ruled that the Beagle Channel continues 
its easterly course until it reaches the Atlantic, the islands would be Chilean. But if they 
could be swayed to believe that the channel bends sharply to the south after passing 
Navarino Island, the islands would belong to Argentina. 
Argentina had conducted advanced hydrological studies to measure the flow of 
water along both branches, as well as mapping the contours of the bottom. They had gone 
to great lengths to attempt to find modern evidence to support their position, but none of 
these studies convinced the ICJ judges. Instead, the court was more interested in the 
intent of the drafters and signers of the Treaty of 1881, with the knowledge of the 
geography and technology available at the time. Ultimately, they decided that since the 
writers of the treaty had not precisely specified what the exact path of the channel was, 
they would have intended for it to be interpreted in the most self-evident manner. Had 
they actually intended that the boundary would include a sharp turn that was not intuitive, 
they would surely have specified that in detail. Since they did not, it seemed reasonable 
to assume that the belief of the framers was that the channel continued east in the most 
obvious manner. It also did not help Buenos Aires’ case that maps drawn by the 
Argentine government prior to 1891 plainly showed the islands as Chilean.61 
2. The Verdict 
In 1977, Queen Elizabeth II had approved their verdict of the panel of ICJ judges 
that all three islands rightfully belonged to Chile.62 Chileans rejoiced, although General 
Augusto Pinochet was placed in the slightly awkward position of commending the 
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wisdom of the former president Allende, who he had helped to oust from power. The new 
Argentine military government, led by General Jorge Videla, was shocked. Despite the 
rather flimsy legal nature of their claim, they had expected that at worst, a compromise 
would be handed down that would award them at least one of the islands.63 This 
validation of Chile’s position put Argentina squarely back in their original predicament of 
having their claims to the South Atlantic jeopardized. Faced with a prospect that they 
considered to be a violation of the bioceanic principle and their national rights, the junta 
made the surprising decision to reject the legally binding arbitration, which naturally 
prompted Chilean protests.64  
This act of governmental petulance sent the dispute back to square one, or 
possibly worse. Now Chile was convinced that Argentina had no intention whatsoever of 
honoring any agreements unless all results came out in their favor. Argentina attempted 
to restart bilateral negotiations, but very little progress was made. Chile rather 
understandably saw no need to make concessions or negotiate for something that had just 
been officially confirmed to be rightfully theirs. 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE ARGENTINE PRN JUNTA 
It is difficult to overstate the horrendous condition of the Argentine political 
situation in 1975–76. The country had just held popular elections in 1973 and returned to 
civilian rule after the seven years of military government during the Revolución 
Argentina. For the first time since 1955, the Partido Justicialista (PJ), the Peronist party 
and the most popular in the country, was allowed to compete.65 Juan Perón predictably 
returned to the presidency, but for reasons that are still debated, he selected his third wife, 
María Estela “Isabel” Martínez de Perón, as his choice of running mate and subsequent 
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Vice President.66 This sowed the seeds of future disaster.67 The kindest thing to say about 
the new Mrs. Perón is that she had no significant political experience.68 
Clearly, few among those who voted for Juan Perón ever seriously considered that 
Isabel might actually have to take on the presidential duties. Yet that is exactly what 
occurred when Juan Perón died on July 1, 1974. The Argentine economy and the physical 
security of the nation, which had been going downhill throughout the 1970s, took an even 
worse turn after Perón’s death, and the country seemed to be descending into chaos and 
lawlessness.69 Public calls for the military to intervene were quick in coming, and a 
carefully planned coup removed the hapless Isabel from power on March 24, 1976, to 
widespread relief.70 
1. A Welcome Coup 
The new junta, which labeled this era of military rule the Proceso de 
Reorganización Nacional (PRN, National Reorganization Process), therefore began their 
undefined period of governance with a credible popular mandate to cure the nation’s ills. 
The highest priorities were to defeat the armed left-wing guerrillas who had been 
conducting a campaign of violence against the military since 1970,71 and also to remedy 
the dire state of the economy. In the first instance, the military only had to escalate the 
Guerra Sucia against the subversives begun by Isabel Perón and her extreme right-wing 
advisor José López Rega in 1975.72 
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Economic success proved to be more elusive, although the junta registered some 
early, if temporary, success against rampant inflation.73 While no evident progress was 
being made towards holding elections as a prelude to a transition back to civilian 
governance, recent memories of political malfeasance had temporarily cured Argentines 
of any nostalgia for elected leadership. Taken as a whole, then, the military seemed to be 
in a reasonably solid position when the conflict with Chile over the Beagle Channel 
islands heated up in 1977. The junta members were still in the early phase of their rule. 
The guerrilla problem was being brought under control,74 public unrest was minimal, and 
the junta did not appear to be at any significant risk of losing political power. According 
to prospect theory, this suggests that they would be less willing to take a risk by choosing 
to escalate their territorial dispute with Chile into open warfare. 
C. THE DISPUTE INTENSIFIES 
When arbitration went against it, Argentina attempted to restart direct bilateral 
negotiations. Numerous meetings and summits with the Chilean leadership with proposed 
compromises to divide possession of the islands were rebuffed by Santiago because the 
Chileans simply saw no reason to negotiate bilaterally for something they already had.75 
Chile proposed submitting their case directly to the UN ICJ, but Argentina refused, 
probably because they anticipated an identical decision, since the jurists who made the 
arbitration ruling had come from the ICJ.76  
The hardliners in the junta, such as Admiral Emilio Massera, the head of the 
Argentine Navy, began to step up their war rhetoric and advocated for an invasion to take 
the islands by force.77 Chile, under the firm control of General Pinochet, clearly stated 
their utmost determination to defend their sovereign territory rather than submit to 
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Argentine intimidation and saber rattling.78 Both nations made preparations to deploy 
forces to the southern region. The two nations were reasonably matched militarily; 
Argentina probably had the edge in ground and air forces, but Chile was a stronger naval 
power, and they had the advantage of defending difficult terrain.79   
1. Videla Marginalized 
With the threat of war looming, the hardliners in the junta began to take more 
control, and Army chief and de facto President Videla, a moderate within the strongly 
right-wing junta, was no longer included in all decisions.80 Videla no doubt realized that 
any sign of hesitation or weakness on his part would promptly lead to him becoming the 
next casualty of the Argentine presidential revolving door. Provocative and ultra-
nationalistic statements made by the junta members succeeded in arousing public 
sentiment, and also inconveniently distracted them from economic difficulties and the 
state-sponsored internal violence of the Guerra Sucia.81 Inflammatory appeals were made 
to the Argentine myth of their perpetual territorial victimhood, exhorting the people to 
resist the threat of the motherland being dismembered once again. But despite these 
feelings of nationalism, only the hardliners in the government really believed that the 
islands were worth going to war over. Those who watched the conflict brewing were in 
disbelief that in this modern era, two countries were poised to go to war over these tiny 
and seemingly insignificant islands. However, having created an international situation 
through an appeal to jingoistic patriotism, the junta found it difficult to back down.82 
Feeling itself to be out of options, the junta issued secret orders to prepare for a 
military invasion of the PNL islands to take place on December 21, 1978.83 Seeking to 
inspire patriotic fervor in the troops, it was named Operación Soberanía (Operation 
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Sovereignty). Both countries deployed squadrons of warships to the disputed area, 
although bad weather prevented them from coming into contact with each other.84 
Argentina began deporting Chilean citizens from Patagonia.85 Tensions were rising to 
dangerous levels. 
D. ESCALATION CONTINUES 
As 1978 drew towards a close, antagonism over the PNL islands continued to 
mount on both sides of the Andes. Although General Videla, as President, was nominally 
in control of the country, his authority was limited and insecure. Beginning in August 
1978, the position of president was separated from the junta, resulting in four top military 
leaders instead of three.86 The president could theoretically come from any service, but 
the Army’s preeminence meant that they were able to hold on to the presidency 
throughout the course of the PRN. Additionally, the precedent had been set for the heads 
of the three services that made up the junta to remove the president at any time with a 
unanimous vote.87 The junta in late 1978 consisted of General Roberto Viola from the 
Army, Admiral Armando Lambruschini from the Navy, and General Omar Graffigna 
from the Air Force.88  
University of Maryland IR theorist Paul Huth characterized the dilemmas faced 
by state leaders as89  
…balance(ing) two critical political roles: (1) they are held accountable 
for preserving the national security of their country, and (2) they are 
politicians who seek to remain in power and thus are concerned with 
political opposition from counter-elites. 
This fits very well the difficult position that Videla found himself in. The rising 
tide of rhetoric and fervor was inexorably pushing him towards a war that he did not 
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really want. Once the PNL islands were presented to the public as vital to Argentina’s 
national security and prestige, it was very difficult to back down. Not only would he have 
lost face and risked public unrest, but he almost certainly would have been quickly 
removed from power by the right-wing hardliners in the junta. He was trapped, and could 
see no way to deescalate the crisis without being deposed and replaced by someone more 
willing to pursue war.90  
1. Desautorizado 
Then, on December 12, it appeared as though a breakthrough had been made. 
Hernan Cubillos of Chile and Brigadier General Carlos Pastor of Argentina, the two 
respective Foreign Ministers, met in Buenos Aires and agreed to submit a request for 
mediation to Pope John Paul II.91 It seemed that all that remained was to sign the official 
paperwork and the war would be averted. However, in a strange development, upon 
receiving report of the verbal agreement made by the Foreign Ministers, the junta 
responded by revoking Pastor’s authorization to perform the functions of his position.92 
The reason they did this is unclear. Perhaps some members felt that taking this action of 
their own volition conveyed the impression that they were not serious about obtaining the 
PNL islands. Regardless of the motivation, it seemed that the last chance to avoid war 
had just been snatched away. After Cubillos reported what had transpired, the Chilean 
government began to raise the red flag of alarm to the world. They requested an 
emergency meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) to deter Argentine 
aggression and notified any and all parties with any influence in Latin America that 
Argentina was on the cusp of starting a war.93 
                                                
90 Mares, Violent Peace, 146. 
91 Princen, Intermediary intervention, 116. 
92 Ibid., 117. 
93 Struthers, Beagle Channel Dispute, 129. 
 35 
E. AN OFF-RAMP AT LAST 
The Argentine junta gave the final orders to launch Operación Soberanía on 
December 21, 1978, which would be a full attack on the disputed islands as well as other 
key positions in southern Chile.94 But just when the Argentine fleet was closing in on the 
position of the Chilean fleet and war seemed imminent, a fierce South Atlantic storm 
swept through the area and made combat temporarily impractical. The attack was 
delayed, but rescheduled for the following day.  
This time, just when the attack was about to be launched, orders were given to 
stand down and return home.95 Even though the Pope had not been formally requested to 
mediate the dispute, he was being kept well abreast of the state of affairs by the Vatican’s 
nuncios in Buenos Aires and Santiago. On December 22, the rescheduled day of 
Argentina’s invasion, the Pope personally called the Presidents of both countries and 
asked them to refrain from attempting to resolve their differences through violence.96 He 
offered the services of the Vatican to mediate their dispute, and to send his personal 
representative Cardinal Antonio Samoré to meet with them.97  
This gave Argentina the off-ramp that they needed in order to call off the invasion 
without losing face or their hold on power. Because the Pope had made this direct request 
of them, they would not be backing down from weakness or because Chile had called 
their bluff, they would be respecting the wishes of the Holy Father in Rome. The high 
level of prestige and respect for the Holy See in Latin America made this a fully 
acceptable option for their populations. However, regardless of due respect for the Pope, 
the fact that even the right-wing nationalist junta members agreed to withdraw most 
likely indicates their lack of conviction that the risks of the island grab were worth the  
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potential return. As will be described later in this chapter, this process of assessing risk in 
relation to the stability of their political position is crucial to explaining the actions of the 
junta.  
F. DOMESTIC POLITICS 
Although the deep desire for control of the South Atlantic and their claimed 
section of Antarctica was important, the main factor that drove this conflict to the brink 
of war was the domestic politics of Argentina. The military had presented a thoroughly 
united front when they launched their heralded coup in 1976. Detailed discussion and 
planning had enabled them to preemptively address and solve many of the organizational 
problems that a new government always faces. They had already designated people who 
would assume key governmental positions and decided which branch of the military 
would have responsibility for each of the ministries.98 
1. Factionalism 
However, once the junta was established in power and began to go about the 
business of actually running the country, it was not long before tensions and factionalism 
grew and blossomed. The Ministry of the Economy was the single ministry that had been 
left under civilian control, although naturally under the watchful eye of the military. The 
new minister, José Martínez de Hoz, was given approval to conduct drastic neoliberal 
reforms of the sort that had proven effective for Chile.99 However, unlike Chile, where 
Pinochet was able to consolidate power in himself, the Argentine military government 
quickly began to fragment and squabble amongst themselves over policy. Service 
rivalries and the desires of individuals to protect their own ministries and departments 
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opposition with nearly every new policy he attempted to enact. The end result was a half-
enacted reform that contributed to severe loss of regime cohesion and eventually led to 
economic disaster.100 
2. Regime Factors 
Duke University Latin American expert Karen Remmer groups all military 
regimes in South America into four fairly self-explanatory categories; monarchical, 
oligarchic, sultanistic, and feudal. She then adds up the years that each regime remained 
in power, and calculates the average durability of each type of regime.101 Argentina’s 
PRN rule is classified as a feudal military regime, which have an average durability of 
6.5 years, the lowest of the four types of structures. For comparison, the average 
durability of a sultanistic military regime (such as those of Pinochet and Stroessner) is 
25.1 years. 
Remmer believes that institutional factors at work in feudal military regimes 
cause them to produce greater military factionalism than other regime types. She also 
provides examples that show that the level of military unity or factionalism when taking 
power is not a guarantee of what type of regime will be established. The militaries of 
Chile and Argentina were both highly unified when they launched their coups in 1973 
and 1976, respectively. Nevertheless, largely because of the strength of the individuals 
involved in government, Chile developed into a sultanistic regime while Argentina 
became a feudal regime. Based on this study, the causal factor that led to the divisive 
factionalism of the Argentine military government was the lack of a powerful enough 
figure to consolidate his personal rule of the military and the state.102 This factionalism 
and pervasive service rivalries would have a detrimental effect on the junta’s ability to 
govern throughout their rule, and this weakness would contribute to the lack of regime 
security in the later years of the junta. 
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3. The Role of Parity 
The relative military parity between Chile and Argentina also contributed to the 
development of the confrontation. Political scientists and policy makers who examine this 
case for future lessons would do well to consider the words of Vasquez. “If leaders of 
two relatively equal states attempt to deal with territorial disputes by engaging in power 
politics, they will likely find themselves at war.”103 This is a result of both sides feeling 
that they are able match the military power of their opponent and therefore have no 
reason to back down or accept unfavorable terms. The power politics and nationalistic 
rhetoric of the junta backed them into a corner, because Chile did not fear Argentine 
military strength and therefore was not intimidated into relinquishing the PNL islands. 
G. WHY DID DE-ESCALATION OCCUR? 
The operative question is why the Argentine junta decided to call off Operación 
Soberanía and return to the negotiating table. What factor caused them to calculate that 
the potential gains from the operation were not worth the probable costs? The Chileans 
were in physical possession of the disputed islands and had not shown any indication of 
wavering in their resolve to defend them with all available resources, so that facet of the 
confrontation was not in any doubt.  
Both countries were under military rule and featured governments that were only 
moderately accountable to their domestic constituency. There were some rumblings from 
the population over the seemingly disproportionate military response at great cost of lives 
and money to the actual value of the tiny and inhospitable islands, but any serious 
objections seemed to be drowned out by the surge of nationalism that the governments 
had stirred up by presenting the issue as one of sovereignty, rights and respect, and 
national pride. 
The Argentine junta had reason to feel reasonably secure in their position of 
power. The civilian government they had overthrown in 1976 had most likely been the 
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worst in recent memory, and significant progress had been made in the war against the 
internal subversives that had plagued the country for over 8 years. Even more 
importantly, the full extent of the inhumane and illegal means that the government was 
using to conduct this war had not yet become public knowledge.  
1. The Junta’s Choice 
To apply prospect theory to this situation, the junta was presented with a choice of 
two options. Since Chile was not backing down, the Argentine government had to 
conduct an analysis of the potential benefits and costs of an attempt to back up their 
claims with military force. Launching an invasion carried the possibility of gaining 
physical possession of the islands, even if the action would not have garnered any 
international recognition of the territory. This would also have assuaged Argentine 
geopolitical fears that Chile sought to use the PNL islands as the basis of a claim on 
South Atlantic waters.  
However, this move carried significant risks. A military clash against well-trained 
Chilean forces defending rugged terrain in severe weather would be practically 
guaranteed to produce a sizable amount of Argentine casualties. Chile had also 
dispatched nearly their entire naval fleet to the inhospitable southern region, which 
indicated that an indeterminate number of Argentine ships and crew would also not be 
likely to survive any hostile encounter.104 A military attack was by no means doomed to 
failure, but it did seem certain that even if the Argentine forces were victorious and 
succeeded in seizing the disputed territory, they would pay a heavy price in lives and 
equipment to do so.105 Additionally, even if the island grab met with success, they would 
undoubtedly suffer numerous political consequences in the international arena, such as 
sanctions and general condemnation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a military 
defeat would have likely had grave consequences on the junta’s ability to remain in 
control of the nation. Therefore, a military escalation of the dispute to open war would be 
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a significant and risky gamble by the junta, with significant costs even if it succeeded and 
a potential ousting from power if it failed. 
2. The Domain of Gains 
Alternatively, refraining from a military invasion of the PNL islands was the less 
risky option. They would face a slight loss of face and a certain measure of domestic 
criticism, but would be unlikely to incur a regime-threatening reaction. Prospect theory 
indicates that people are more likely to behave in a risk-averse manner when they are 
weighing the costs and benefits of a potential gain (in the domain of gains) than when 
they are analyzing costs and benefits of an imminent loss (in the domain of losses). 
Therefore, a person who feels himself to be in the domain of losses is more likely to take 
a risky gamble to attempt to avoid the looming losses and “break even.” Conversely, a 
person who feels himself to be in the domain of gains will be more cautious and less 
inclined to risk what they already possess in an attempt to acquire more.  
Since the junta still felt relatively secure in 1978, they were operating in the 
domain of gains, and therefore less likely to take a gamble by launching an invasion of 
the PNL islands. Although the Argentine junta had allowed themselves to be backed into 
a corner by the wave of nationalism that they themselves had stirred up, when the 
opportunity arose to back down and allow the Pope to mediate while saving face 
domestically, it was a relatively simple decision to cancel their attack and hold on to what 
they already possessed. 
H. FINAL RESOLUTION 
It is probable that the Argentine leadership privately knew their legal claim to the 
PNL islands was weak. Even Argentina’s own maps in the nineteenth century showed 
that the islands belonged to Chile.106 However, belatedly claiming the PNL islands was 
the best solution they could think of to prevent Chile from extending their maritime 
sovereignty into the South Atlantic, which they were desperate to avoid at all costs. 
                                                
106 Struthers, Beagle Channel Dispute, 46. 
 41 
Fortunately for the future of Argentine-Chilean relations, Cardinal Samoré and the other 
Vatican negotiators made the realization that the key to resolving the matter was 
Argentine fears about control of the South Atlantic. Therefore, in 1980 the Pope invited 
the Foreign Ministers of both countries to the Vatican and gave them his answer. He 
proposed a compromise wherein Chile would keep possession of all three islands, but 
only claim 12 miles of territorial waters around them instead of 200.107 This would allow 
Argentina to preserve their notions of Atlantic sovereignty without requiring Chile to 
surrender any land. 
Chile indicated that it was willing to make this concession, but even so, the 
hardliners in the Argentine military were reluctant to agree to any change from the 
position that they had convinced themselves was right. With the junta still in charge and 
nationalist sentiment holding sway, more moderate officers who may have been inclined 
to accept the compromise were unable to come forward in favor of the compromise 
without appearing unpatriotic. It was not until military rule had collapsed as a result of 
the Falklands disaster in 1982 that there seemed to be a real potential for the Pope’s 
proposal to be accepted.108 
1. Alfonsin Settles the Matter 
Raúl Alfonsín, Argentina’s first civilian president since Isabel Perón, was more 
than ready to accept the Pope’s ruling so that the nation could move on to more important 
matters.109 However, he was very aware of the fragility of Argentine democracy, and 
how accustomed the military was to taking over if they believed civilian rule was 
threatening national interests. Therefore, in July 1984, he very cleverly devised a means 
to mitigate the risk from the military hardliners. He simply consulted the people by 
means of a non-binding voluntary public referendum.110 The fact that there was no 
provision in Argentine law for such a referendum was conveniently overlooked. Seventy 
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percent of all eligible voters participated, and seventy-one percent of them voted in favor 
of accepting the Pope’s compromise. Despite the fact that the referendum had no 
constitutional basis and carried no legal weight, when faced with such a strong 
demonstration of the will of the people, the hardliners felt they had no choice but to 
accept Alfonsin’s desire to resolve the issue once and for all.111 Once the papal mediation 
had reduced the maritime claim surrounding the islands from 200 to 12 miles, which 
limited Chile’s ability to make claims to the South Atlantic, it was not worthwhile to 
object further. 
 
Figure 6.   Final Agreement of the Boundary (From Lagos Carmona, 1985)112 
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III. THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter II, the Argentine junta elected not to invade the Chilean-
held PNL islands in 1978 because they felt themselves to be solidly in control of the 
country, and were unwilling to risk the political consequences of a military setback. 
However, the junta was in a much shakier political position by 1982. They had failed to 
restore prosperity and had proven inept at governing. Domestic and international outrage 
at the human rights abuses of the Guerra Sucia was building rapidly. Their days in the 
presidential palace appeared to be numbered. Therefore, they saw themselves to be in the 
domain of losses, and were much more willing to take a bold risk with the promise of 
“breaking even.” They sought a dramatic act that would cause Argentines to overlook 
their failings, unite the nation, and legitimize their rule. Seizing the long coveted 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands seemed to offer an opportunity for military and political 
success—Argentines would rejoice over the recovery of what they saw as national 
territory, while London seemed too distant to react militarily to a junta-orchestrated fait 
accompli. 
This chapter will first discuss the junta’s political situation in 1982 and the factors 
that made the Falklands an attractive target. It will then detail the predictions and 
numerous misperceptions of the junta, and then the various British obstacles to action, as 
well as international factors. The next section will describe the original plan of the island 
grab, followed by the situation in South Georgia Island which influenced the junta to 
accelerate their plans, leading to their disastrous defeat. The final section will show how 
prospect theory accurately explains the decisions of the junta, who were operating deeply 
in the domain of losses. 
B. THE JUNTA’S PRECARIOUS POSITION 
In contrast to 1976–78, by 1982 the junta was presiding over a rapidly sinking 
ship, and they knew it. Their efforts to boost the economy and restore confidence in the 
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Argentine peso had failed, and rampant inflation had returned. The brutal repression and 
shocking human rights violations of the Guerra Sucia were drawing condemnation from 
all over the world and turning Argentina into a global pariah. Domestic protests, such as 
the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, and coordinated labor strikes were gaining momentum 
and nearing the point when they could exceed the state’s capacity for repression. 
Although U.S. President Ronald Reagan expressed some anti-communist sympathy to the 
junta members in 1981, the U.S. Congress under the Carter Administration had already 
passed bills that terminated all arms sales and military aid to Argentina and barred 
Argentine officers from receiving any training given by the United States.113 The regime 
was under heavy pressure from within and from without, isolated from former allies, and 
mired soundly in the domain of losses. The junta was therefore highly disposed to 
consider a risky venture that carried the promise of potentially breaking even. 
Unsurprisingly, to a group of lifelong military officers, a military conquest seemed like 
the perfect solution. 
After the intense anti-subversive campaign following the 1976 coup had 
successfully brought guerrilla violence down to minimal levels, the military had been 
growing restless and searching for a new mission. The junta members also realized that if 
they embarked on a military campaign that would ignite patriotic fervor in the population, 
feelings of nationalism and unity might overcome anger at the military leaders and fear 
about the economy.114 However, military action would also carry significant risk. If it 
ended in failure and defeat, it would amplify their current predicament and practically 
guarantee a swift expulsion from power on unfavorable terms.  
1. Internal Pressure 
Once again, the domestic politics of the government played a dominant role. 
General Jorge Videla had been ousted in an internal coup in March of 1981, and his more 
moderate successor, General Roberto Viola, attempted to create greater political opening 
in the government by naming more civilians to governmental positions and attempting to 
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mend fences with the political left.115 Unfortunately for him, the hardliners still wielded 
the majority of the power, and General Leopoldo Galtieri orchestrated his own internal 
coup a mere nine months later, using Viola’s poor health as a pretext.116 By that time, 
Argentina’s economy was in complete shambles and the truth about the brutal repression 
of the Guerra Sucia was beginning to emerge. For this reason, Galtieri suspected that he 
and the rest of the junta might not be long in the seat of power if he did not take 
substantial action soon.117 In a meeting on 5 January 1982, the junta decided that a 
favorable resolution of the Falkland Islands dispute with the government of Great Britain 
would be their dominant objective for the coming year. They also resolved to create a 
secret plan for military action if negotiations failed. 118  
2. New Composition of the Junta 
In early 1982, the junta consisted of General Galtieri from the Army, Admiral 
Jorge Anaya from the Navy, and General Basilio Lami-Dozo from the Air Force.119 
Galtieri had also established himself as President when he seized power from General 
Viola on December 22, 1981. In a break with prior practice among Argentine juntas, he 
had not given up his position as commander in chief of the Army, which meant that he 
simultaneously held two of the four key positions of power in the government.120 Thanks 
in large part to the support of Anaya, Galtieri had been able to successfully launch his 
coup. Therefore, Anaya possessed a significant amount of leverage over the new 
President, and used it to press for action in the South Atlantic disputes. The Argentine 
Navy has traditionally been influenced by geopolitical thinking with its concomitant 
expansive views of national sovereignty, and Anaya certainly fit that mold. For his own 
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part, Lami-Dozo seems to have rarely made statements or expressed his opinions 
publically, and he does not appear to have challenged the policies of Galtieri in any 
significant way. 
C. THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS ISLANDS 
Argentina had rejected the Pope’s mediated compromise settlement concerning 
the PNL islands in 1980, and full resolution would not come until 1984.121 Tensions were 
therefore still high with Chile, and the PNL islands may have been once again been 
considered as a target of invasion. But the downside of that prospect was that there were 
no illusions regarding the Chilean willingness to defend the islands, nor was it clear that 
Argentina would win. Even if they were successful, the endeavor was nearly certain to be 
highly costly and to produce a large number of casualties. 
1. A Matter of National Pride 
On the other hand, the Falklands were an even more inviting target, and a much 
more valuable prize. Not only were they inhabited and of some actual value, but also they 
had once belonged to Argentina in the early 1800s before Great Britain occupied them. 
Consequently, every Argentine schoolchild has learned that the Islas Malvinas are 
rightfully theirs and will be reclaimed when the time is right.122 Argentina also claims the 
even more remote and desolate South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, which are 
generally seen as dependencies of the Falklands, but also provide another link in the 
island chain that stretches to the coveted Antarctic. For the beleaguered junta, the time 
was most definitely right to play their trump card. No true Argentine would ever speak or 
act against the state while it was fighting to restore the nation’s birthright and banish the 
last physical vestige of colonialism from the motherland, they reasoned.123 
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2. Other Advantages 
Several other factors made the Falklands and its dependencies a more inviting 
target than the PNL islands, beginning with the fact that they are in a highly strategic 
location, and their possession would enable Argentina to lay claim to a vast expanse of 
the resource-rich South Atlantic; that territories rich in natural resources naturally incite 
the most conflict.124 However, American political scientist Paul Hensel believes that the 
“intangible” value and psychological significance of lands seen as “a part of the national 
identity” strongly outweighs considerations based resources.125 Interestingly, American 
sociologist Carlos Waisman believes that the junta had learned from the Beagle Channel 
dispute that the prospect of “liberating” a claimed national territory was the best possible 
way to rally the nation.126 
Another advantage to making a play for the Falklands was that Britain’s 
occupation was commonly perceived globally as a holdover from the colonial era. As the 
Argentine leadership had hoped, the unfavorable report from the UN Committee on 
Decolonization brought the sovereignty issue to the forefront.127 Galtieri therefore 
believed that as long as the invasion was successfully completed with minimal casualties, 
the UN would treat it as a fait accompli, strongly discourage any further military action, 
and demand concessions from both sides.128  
3. Origins of the Misperception 
Once the junta was prepared to consider a risky action, the largest incentive to 
invade the Falklands followed from the belief that Britain would not retaliate. This 
assumption, which pervaded every level of the Argentine planning for the invasion, 
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would cost them dearly.129 In their defense, this was not an entirely unreasonable 
hypothesis for several reasons. Freedman points out that the context of the settlement of 
the Rhodesian affair in 1981 may have given the impression that Britain was seeking to 
reduce her overseas commitments.130 Of course, Rhodesia, where a minority white 
government ruled a majority black population, was very different from the situation in the 
Falklands. Norden suggests that the islands were of limited value to Britain, and 
discusses the enormous expense required to assemble a suitable task force to retake the 
islands so far distant from home waters.131 However, Wynia points out the strong 
domestic opposition to relinquishing the islands that the British government faced. 
Regardless of their actual material value, they considered them to be sovereign British 
territory, and they were extremely reluctant to abandon them, especially to an 
authoritarian military regime with a very poor human rights record.132 
4. Argentine Advantages 
Nietzel gives a comprehensive comparison of the military forces involved, which 
can be summarized by saying that Argentine ground troops were markedly inferior to 
their British equivalents, but that Argentina enjoyed a reasonable local naval parity and a 
marked air superiority, at least by number of available fixed wing combat aircraft.133 
Fighting the war practically in their backyard also gave Argentina many logistical and 
tactical advantages. Additionally, the junta anticipated complete moral, political, and 
logistical support from all Western Hemisphere countries via the Organization of 
American States and the Rio Treaty of Joint Interamerican Defense.134  
All of these factors seemed to tilt the balance in favor of an invasion (although 
many of their assumptions would later prove to be disastrously inaccurate), and 
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convinced Buenos Aires of the high probability of success that would unite their heavily 
fractured population and maintain their hold on political power.135 It also offered several 
advantages over provoking a war with Chile over the PNL islands. First, although Britain 
had a more powerful military overall than Chile, the combination of British forces 
dispersed throughout the world and the tyranny of distance virtually guaranteed that even 
if London chose to fight, Argentina would ultimately be facing only a small percentage of 
Britain’s full strength. Second, Chile had made it very clear that it was fully prepared and 
committed to defending the PNL islands, whereas Britain’s resolve was less easy to 
gage.136 And finally, the desire to reclaim the Falklands is so deeply ingrained into every 
Argentine that regardless of any level of internal strife or discord, they would unite in a 
heartbeat behind any leader able to recapture them. 
D. THE ARGENTINE PREDICTIONS 
As the military junta of Argentina developed their secretive plan to seize and 
occupy the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, they devoted a great deal of thought to how Great 
Britain and the global community would respond. After much analysis and discussion, 
they came to the conclusion that overall global response would be restrained, and that 
most states in the Western Hemisphere would actually support the seizure as a blow of 
liberation against colonialism. The junta also planned to invoke the hemispheric defense 
pact signed in 1947 and known as the Rio Treaty, which specifies that an attack on any of 
the signatory states will be treated as an attack on all.  
1. Erroneous Predictions 
Taking into consideration all of these factors and signals, the junta decided that 
Britain lacked the resolve and the political will to respond to a seizure of the Falklands 
with enough force to recover them. Certainly some official protest and complaints were 
to be expected, and perhaps some diplomatic and economic consequences would follow. 
They also anticipated that Britain would dispatch submarines to the area to gather 
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information, but likely not for the purpose of attacking any ships. The Argentine forces 
that seized the islands were also following strict orders to avoid inflicting any casualties, 
so that British passions and international outrage would not be stirred up by 
bloodshed.137 
On the global stage, the junta believed that the general response to the seizure 
would be tacit acceptance, or at worst, mild disapproval. The primary reason for this 
optimism was the prevalent feeling in the world that the British occupation of the 
Falklands was a vestige of European colonialism, and should be relinquished. Because of 
this, the junta expected that any country that had suffered from colonialism and its 
aftermath would identify with Argentina and put pressure on the British to negotiate a 
settlement with no further use of force. The junta members were not entirely mistaken 
about the anti-colonialism sentiments that were common throughout the world and 
especially in Latin America, but one of the main downfalls of this line of thought is that 
they seemed to be unaware of how unfavorable their international reputation was. 
Recurring military coups and a woeful human rights record including untold thousands of 
desaparecidos meant that the surprise military invasion was not universally viewed as a 
shining example of justice, as the junta had anticipated.138 
2. The Downside of Secrecy 
Unfortunately for the junta, they had kept the planning for the invasion so secret 
that they had not even informed their own intelligence service in order to have their 
assistance in predicting the reactions of other states. When the junta did finally brief 
knowledgeable representatives of the military intelligence service and ask for their 
assessment, their predictions were not as encouraging. But by that point, the islands had 
already been seized, and the die was cast.139 
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E. THE BRITISH OBSTACLES 
The profusion of impediments to any campaign to reoccupy the Falklands began 
with the fact that the archipelago lay almost 7,000 nautical miles from the British home 
islands, with only open ocean in between. Britain did not possess any other territory with 
a suitable airfield anywhere within 3,000 nautical miles, meaning that on-scene air 
support/cover would be limited to carrier-based aircraft.140  
1. Downsizing 
Britain was in the process of significantly downsizing the Royal Navy’s 
amphibious ships, based on prevailing assumptions that the days of amphibious landings 
were past. Aircraft carriers were also deemed to be outdated in the age of long-range 
aircraft. For this reason, the HMS Hermes was scheduled for decommissioning, while the 
HMS Invincible was to be sold to Australia. Britain also planned to decommission the ice 
patrol vessel HMS Endurance, which was the only Royal Navy ship that still maintained 
any regular presence in the South Atlantic. The decommissioning of all these key ships 
sent a clear signal to the junta that Britain’s will and capacity to engage in far-ranging 
naval combat was fast waning.141  
Nor, in the eyes of the junta, did the Falklands have any strategic value to Britain. 
Originally occupied by Britain for use as a coaling station, modern naval propulsion 
technology meant that they no longer imparted the same logistical value. Rocky and 
inhospitable with a brutal climate, they were very sparsely populated and used primarily 
for raising sheep. On the political side, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was then seen 
as a weak leader who led a nation in poor economic shape and with a full plate of other 
domestic issues, such as strikes. However, the junta failed to anticipate a similar “rally 
round the flag” tactic by Thatcher, harnessing public outrage over the attack on British 
sovereignty in order to quell dissent and disunity in her government. 
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2. Seemingly Impossible Odds 
In summary, from the Argentine perspective, a weak female head of state with a 
budget crisis and a restless populace would have to order a major naval amphibious task 
force (mostly from ships already scheduled for decommissioning) to commence a very 
expensive logistical nightmare of a mission to the far side of the earth in some of the 
roughest seas and worst weather on the planet. As if that were not enough, after sailing 
7,000 nautical miles to try a recover a few windswept rocks of little actual value, they 
would have to assault a numerically superior and firmly entrenched occupying force that, 
by comparison, would practically be fighting in their own backyard.  
F. THE AMERICAN ASPECT 
In another crucial misjudgment, there is significant evidence that Galtieri believed 
the U.S. would support an Argentine seizure of the Falklands, or at least remain 
neutral.142 When Galtieri met with President Reagan in Washington D.C. in early 1982, 
he somehow came away with the impression that in the event of a conflict over the 
Falklands, America would side with Argentina against Britain. He seemed to believe that 
even in the worst case, the U.S. would remain neutral and not provide any assistance to 
either side.143 
In fairness, the message that Washington had been sending to Latin America 
through most of the 1970s was that any concerns regarding democracy and human rights 
were much less important than preventing the spread of communism. The junta may not 
have had a stellar human rights record, but its anti-communist credentials were spotless. 
The Argentine military had even been doing a great service for the United States by 
deploying to Central America and training anti-communist groups such as the Contra 
rebels in Nicaragua.144  
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Nevertheless, the idea that the United States would back Argentine aggression 
against their strongest NATO ally does seem surprisingly naïve. It was also completely 
incorrect. When the seizure occurred, not only did the United States lead the passing of a 
U.N. resolution strongly condemning the assault, but they also assisted Britain with 
significant war materiel, including advanced Sidewinder air-to-air missiles that would 
take a heavy toll on Argentine aircraft.145 Additionally, they facilitated the British use of 
Ascension Island as an airbase and way station, which was especially crucial to the 
success of the amphibious task force.146 
G. THE ORIGINAL PLAN 
1. Isolation Tactic Discarded 
In previous disagreements between Argentina and Great Britain over the status of 
the islands, Argentina had threatened to reduce or sever the economic and transportation 
ties between the Falklands and the South American mainland, which all pass through 
Argentina. This would have resulted in isolation and deprivation for the Falklanders and 
put a tremendous amount of pressure on Britain to replace the lost services, which would 
be massively expensive and logistically challenging. Britain therefore assumed that any 
stirrings of serious trouble from Argentina would begin with similar threats or actions to 
isolate the islands. However, the junta was wary of possible agreements between Chile 
and Britain to replace any severed mainland connections, and therefore decided to jump 
straight to direct military action without warning.147 
2. A Matter of Timing 
Secret military planning quickly began for Operación Rosario, the military 
seizure of the Falklands.148 Once the junta had decided to gamble on a grab for the 
                                                
145 Nietzel, Falklands War, 19. 
146 Julian Thompson. 1991. The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict. Brassey’s, London, 
259. 
147 Freedman, Official History, 142, 150–2, 220. 
148 Norden, Military Rebellion, 71. 
 54 
Falklands and other associated islands, they proceeded with their planning in utmost 
secrecy, probably informing no more than an estimated nine people of the invasion plan. 
They calculated correctly that although a British operation to retake the Falklands would 
be challenging at any time of the year, it would be nearly impossible between July and 
October, when the powerful storms and frigid temperatures of the South Atlantic winter 
render the area barely navigable.149 Any attempts to conduct at-sea refueling or any sort 
of flight operations in those conditions would be practically impossible. Therefore, if the 
Argentine forces could launch a surprise invasion on the lightly garrisoned islands and 
consolidate their control in time for their forces to bunker in for the winter, Britain would 
be forced to wait until spring to take any kind of significant military action. By that time, 
Argentine possession would be more firmly established, international condemnation 
would have faded into the background, and Britain’s ability to muster the political 
momentum to take military action would have been more difficult. 
H. JUMPING THE GUN 
1. The Davidoff Affair and Project Alpha 
However, the junta chose to drastically accelerate their invasion plans because of 
events that were taking place on South Georgia Island. An Argentine businessman named 
Constantino Davidoff had been granted a contract to scrap a long-abandoned whaling 
station on South Georgia. Diplomatic tension began to rise in December 1981 when he 
visited the islands in an Argentine-flagged vessel and failed to follow the established 
procedure of first making a courtesy landing at the British outpost at Grytviken before 
proceeding to the whaling station site at Leith. Davidoff apologized and the incident 
seemed minor, until similar occurrences in March 1982 aroused British concerns that 
Argentina was testing the waters and seeking to inch closer to asserting their claimed 
sovereignty over the island, along with the South Sandwich Islands.150  
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Indeed, the Argentine Navy had seized what seemed to be the perfect opportunity 
to advance Argentine claims on South Georgia. “Project Alpha” consisted of the insertion 
of Argentine Marines in civilian clothing into the supposed working party that landed at 
Leith. Unsubtly, they carried weapons ashore, occupied the uninhabited buildings, hauled 
down the Union Jack, and raised the Argentine flag. Naturally, on such a small island, 
this did not escape the notice of the British at Grytviken. Messages began to fly, 
diplomatic protests were promptly made, and the suspicions of the British Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) were fully aroused. Ironically, Project Alpha turned out to be 
counterproductive because it focused British attention on the South Atlantic.151 
2. Secrecy Compromised 
The MoD had originally believed that Argentina was highly unlikely to take any 
significant action against any of the disputed islands, and that even if they did, it would 
not happen before the merciless South Atlantic winter ended in October. But in light of 
the apparent Argentine military involvement in the South Georgian landings, MoD laid 
the groundwork to shift more military assets to the South Atlantic to defend their interests 
and head off any potential trouble. The junta became aware of this, and decided that their 
window of opportunity for a quick and unopposed invasion was swiftly vanishing. 
Therefore they dramatically accelerated the invasion timeline, moving the date of the first 
amphibious landing on the Falklands from May to the beginning of April. This forced the 
ill-prepared Argentine forces to operate under severe logistical constraints.152 
As previously mentioned, the plans were still being formulated in great secrecy, 
which meant that many key personnel with specific knowledge who might have assisted 
in the planning process were not informed or consulted. Because of this, the junta was 
making decisions with incomplete or inaccurate information, most notably on the 
projected reactions of the British government and the major countries in the Western 
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Hemisphere. A more accurate appreciation of the situation might have changed their 
approach to the islands, but whether it would have deterred the invasion is impossible to 
know. 
3. Resounding Defeat 
The junta’s planning proved to be as faulty as their predictions. No plan had ever 
been formulated to defend the Falklands from a British counterattack, and the different 
military services proved incapable of working together and coordinating their respective 
actions to work towards an advantageous outcome. Essentially, the Argentine Army, 
Navy, and Air Force each fought a separate war against the British task force, and none 
of them wanted to expose their best assets to danger. The Army kept their best troops 
guarding the border with Chile and sent poorly equipped raw conscripts from Argentina’s 
jungle climate to occupy the frozen windswept islands. After the Argentine cruiser A.R.A. 
General Belgrano was sunk by a British submarine, the entire Argentine fleet returned to 
ports on the mainland and did not venture out for the remainder of the war. The Air Force 
decided to keep all of their fixed-wing combat aircraft safely based on the mainland and 
not to shift any of them to airstrips and runways on the Falklands. This added at least an 
extra 600 miles to every combat flight and severely reduced the aircraft on-station time. 
When Britain prompt responded to the invasion with a sizable task force, the 
Argentine military was completely unprepared to wage a coordinated and effective war to 
defend the islands, and they paid heavily. By squandering the advantages they possessed 
due to their proximity to the islands and their control over the invasion timeline, they 
created obstacles for themselves that proved to be insurmountable against an experienced 
and capable British force. After retaking South Georgia on 25 April, the first amphibious 
landings were made on East Falkland on 21 May, and by 14 June all Argentine forces in 
the Falklands had surrendered.153  
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I. WHY DID THE JUNTA TAKE THE GAMBLE? 
Argentina launched an invasion of the disputed Falklands Islands based primarily 
on the perception that Britain did not have the military capability or the political will to 
retake the islands from the occupying Argentine force at that time. Based on all of these 
factors, key Argentine decision-makers assumed that possession would present Margaret 
Thatcher and the world with a fait accompli. After a few British declarations of outrage, 
the issue would eventually be resolved at the negotiating table. For this reason, the junta 
never expected to fight a war, and proved totally unprepared when combat began. 
1. Underestimating the British 
The role of the Argentine misperception is a crucial one. Jack Levy described the 
phenomenon very aptly in his work entitled Misperception and the Causes of War. 
“Military overconfidence deriving from underestimation of the adversary’s capabilities or 
overestimation of one’s own capabilities is an important form of misperception leading to 
war.”154 Put another way, states do not generally initiate wars unless they believe they 
will win. If Argentina had been able to predict that Britain would react with speed and 
strength, it is hard to imagine that they would have chosen to initiate the conflict. Of 
course, they did not consider themselves to be preparing for a war. They merely 
envisioned a swift bloodless seizure followed by an occupation. This overarching 
assumption that Britain would not fight to retake the islands influenced Argentine 
planning at every level. This led to countless flawed decisions, which ultimately led to a 
resounding Argentine defeat. 
2. The Domain of Losses 
As in the Beagle Channel conflict, the operative question is why did the junta 
choose to take the gamble of making a grab for the Falkland Islands instead of playing it 
safe? Prospect theory indicates that typical human beings are more willing to accept 
higher levels of risk when they believe that they are operating in the domain of losses – 
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that is, their position is deteriorating and they are facing a losing situation. The members 
of Argentine junta were textbook examples of people who were very willing to gamble in 
the hopes of reversing their current misfortunes and “breaking even.” The junta badly 
misjudged the British reaction, but for them to be willing to take the gamble in the first 
place, it was essential that they see themselves in the domain of losses. Had they been in 
a more stable economic and political situation, they probably would have been less likely 
to take the gamble of invading a British territory. But because they were so deeply in the 
domain of losses, any course of action that offered a glimmer of redemption became 
more appealing. Unlike Operación Soberanía, if the Pope had called the day before the 
launch of Operación Rosario to request that they refrain from violence, it seems likely 
that Galtieri and the junta would have pressed on regardless, with many apologies to the 
Holy Father. A clean, glorious reclamation of the beloved Islas Malvinas was their only 
chance to dig themselves out of the hole they were in with any sense of credibility and 
legitimacy. 
3. Lack of Resolution 
Unlike the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, the 
governments of Argentina and Great Britain have not been able to resolve the territorial 
dispute over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia Islands, and the South Sandwich 
Islands. Both sides remain unwilling to negotiate their dominant positions—Argentina is 
not interested in discussing any resolution that does not progress towards a transfer of 
sovereignty, and Britain continues to insist that wishes of the Falkland islanders are 
paramount. Rancor over the war has not fully healed, and speculation continues regarding 
undersea natural resources in the area. The dispute persists and lingers, and there appears 










A. WHY SEIZE THE FALKLANDS AND NOT THE PNL ISLANDS? 
In the previous two chapters, we have seen that in the span of a mere four years, 
the military junta that ruled Argentina was faced with two critical decisions regarding 
disputed islands that they claimed but did not occupy. These two cases make for an 
excellent study because few confounding variables stand in the way of a comparative 
analysis. Both cases focus on the decisions made by the Argentine government as they 
evaluated potential actions to be taken towards nearby islands that they claimed but 
which were under control of another country. The cases also take place in the same time 
period and under military rule. The only differing factors were the personnel composition 
of the junta, the proximity and military strength of the potential opponents, and the nature 
of the islands under dispute. 
The popularity of the Argentine military junta declined considerably between 
1976 and 1983. Because the civilian government that fell to the 1976 coup was one of the 
most incompetent and ineffective on record, many Argentines were greatly relieved when 
the military finally took charge.155 The country was being ravaged by internal conflict 
with groups of armed guerrillas conducting bombings, kidnappings, and murders.156 
Even after his death, the shadow of Juan Perón and his political party caused significant 
polarization throughout the nation. In addition, the economy was in complete disarray 
with no prospect of improvement.157 The military could plausibly claim to have a popular 
mandate to vanquish the domestic enemies, enact economic recovery, and restore 
Argentina’s unity and honor.  
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1. The Falklands Option 
There were certainly considerations that made a grab for the Falkland Islands 
appear low risk and high reward. The Falklands are more embedded in the national 
consciousness than are the isolated and unpopulated PNL islands. Also, when sizing up 
an aggressive move for the Falklands, the potential opponent is a distant, former colonial 
power who may possess neither the logistical capability nor the political will to contest an 
Argentine fait accompli. Chile may not possess Britain’s residual military power, but 
Chilean forces are in theater, and they have made their resolve to defend the islands very 
clear. Britain’s resolve for a military response was much more difficult to anticipate.  
2. The PNL Option 
In contrast, invading the PNL islands also had some factors in its favor. Chile has 
always been a significantly weaker military power than Britain, and the comparatively 
low value of the uninhabited small rocky islands might reduce the odds of escalation. 
Also, while the Falkland islanders have made it perfectly clear that they prefer to remain 
part of the United Kingdom, the uninhabited PNL islands are free from this unwanted 
complication.158 Finally, if you are seeking to avoid U.S. involvement, starting a fight 
with Washington’s strongest NATO ally is not a good tactic. 
3. The Utility of Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory performs well in explaining the choices of the junta. In 1978, the 
junta members did not consider themselves in great danger of losing power, and therefore 
they saw themselves to be in the domain of gains. Taking possession of the PNL islands 
would be a pure gain, while refraining from military invasion would likely have no 
adverse effects. Therefore, they were not as inclined to undertake a risky action such as 
an island grab, given the potential negative consequences of an unsuccessful attempt.  
Conversely, when the junta members were weighing their options in 1982, they 
most definitely felt that they were in danger of losing their hold on power, and therefore 
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saw themselves as operating in the domain of losses. Their popularity seemed to be in a 
downward political spiral that could only end in regime transition. Although it would be a 
gamble, a successful seizure of the Falkland Islands would halt that decline and preserve 
their power.  
Prospect theory is most persuasive in situations where traditional methods of 
evaluating human decision-making fail to explain actions taken. Rational choice theory 
assumes that the decision-makers base their decisions on a rational cost/benefit analysis. 
It does not do an adequate job of explaining why Argentina would elect to start a fight 
with Great Britain instead of Chile. Despite the potential benefits that could have 
resulted, launching an invasion of the Falklands was not a rational act. Intentionally 
tweaking the tail of the British tiger in a highly public manner carries tremendous risk. A 
rational, calculated thinker would likely conclude that the potential costs of any 
aggressive islands grabs exceeded the potential gains. This was not a purely rational act, 
but rather a gamble taken in the hopes of salvaging a precarious political situation. 
B. ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS 
1. Diversionary War Theory 
Other theories that help to explain the decision of the junta to launch an invasion 
of the Falkland Islands include diversionary war theory, which proposes that the junta 
seized the Falklands solely to distract their own population from the Guerra Sucia and 
the nation’s economic woes. According to this theory, the primary cause of the war was 
not the misperception of the British reaction, but rather the growing political instability of 
Argentina and the need of the junta to provide a distraction from the domestic issues. 
While it contains a degree of truth, this explanation fails to capture the whole story. 
Jack Levy has written an article entitled “Domestic Politics and War” that 
highlights the appeal of a diversionary war to a beleaguered government. He discusses 
various studies that seem to indicate a link between higher levels of domestic instability 
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and unrest with more frequent outbreaks of wars and bellicose state behavior.159 While it 
is certainly true that the junta benefited politically from the massive upwelling of 
patriotism that accompanied the “liberation” of the islands, this does not explain why 
they believed that an invasion of British territory would buy more than short-term 
popularity. No matter how desperately a government is looking for an external distraction 
from domestic strife, it is clearly counterproductive to begin an external war against a 
stronger power. If the junta had been searching for a purely diversionary war, they would 
have chosen a weaker adversary than Great Britain. 
2. Miscalculation 
Many explanations of the conflict also highlight the junta’s miscalculation of 
international reaction to their seizure of the Falklands. While miscalculation played a 
crucial role, it alone cannot explain the war. The junta first needed a reason to consider a 
military action in the Falklands before they would progress to the level of evaluating 
potential reactions. Also, as Arquilla and Rasmussen point out, there was plenty of time 
between the Argentine seizure of the Falklands on 2 April and the first British military 
action on 25 April on South Georgia, and even longer before the first military action on 
the Falklands themselves, which took place on 1 May (a Vulcan bombing run on the Port 
Stanley airfield). British troops did not land on the Falklands until 21 May. If the junta 
had so desired, this long lull in combat action gave them plenty of chances to back down 
and withdrawn their forces. The optimal moment to take this step may have been after the 
British had retaken South Georgia, because then both sides could deflect any domestic 
criticism by pointing to a minor face-saving military victory. 160  
If the junta had been gambling that Thatcher would not respond militarily, their 
bluff was called when Britain demonstrated their resolve by sending the task force. Had 
they chosen to pull back from their gamble (to “cash in their chips”), they certainly had 
                                                
159 Jack S. Levy. 1988. “Domestic Politics and War.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, 
No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring, 1988). 653–673. 
160 Arquilla and Rasmussen, Origins of the South Atlantic War, 752–753. The authors also believe 
that the military institution had too much influence over the junta members, resulting in both a push for war 
and an unwillingness to negotiate and withdraw after the British task force was launched. Service rivalries 
also played a disruptive role. 
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the opportunity to do so. The junta could have claimed that they had conducted the 
invasion to draw global attention to the colonial injustice, and to pull the recalcitrant 
British back to the negotiating table. Once their point had been made, they could assert 
their commitment to a peaceful resolution and withdraw from the islands of their own 
accord. This would demonstrate that their decision to invade had been made with a 
rational cost/benefit analysis, and they were altering their plan once their analysis was 
proven incorrect and the costs significantly increased. Miscalculation therefore does not 
answer the question of why the junta did not amend their decision to occupy the 
Falklands after Britain had demonstrated the gravity of the junta’s misperception by 
dispatching their naval task force to the islands. 
3. Comparative Security 
The counter-argument could also be made that the junta should have felt less 
secure in 1978 than in 1982, because the internal guerrilla threat posed by the 
Montoneros and the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) was still high in the late 
1970s, but had been wiped out by 1982. This would suggest that the junta should have 
been more disposed to gamble in 1978, which would have led to an invasion of the PNL 
islands instead of the Falklands. However, while individuals in the military may have 
been in more physical personal danger in 1978, the military as an institution was not in 
serious peril of losing its hold on power. The guerrillas caused significant deaths and 
injuries, mostly to military and law enforcement personnel and their families, but they did 
not have the force required to topple the junta.161  
4. Power Retained? 
As a counterfactual, Arquilla and Rasmussen believe that the junta was in solid 
control of the country because of the extensive repression of the dirty war. Had they not 
launched the Falklands invasion, they would have remained in power.162 However, 
considering the level of pressure against the junta that was building on both the domestic 
                                                
161 Moyano, Lost Patrol, 152-155. 
162 Arquilla and Rasmussen, Origins of the South Atlantic War, 747–8. 
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and international fronts, this is debatable, but impossible to discount completely. 
Regardless, the key component for this application of prospect theory is not the actual 
situation of the decision-makers, but rather the position that they believe themselves to be 
in. The question of whether the junta would have been forced out of power is less 
relevant than the question of whether the junta members felt that they were in danger of 
losing power. It seems reasonably safe to say that by the spring of 1982, facing the 
rapidly self-destructing economy and a widespread upwelling of outrage over the Guerra 
Sucia, the junta members felt that there was a significant risk that they would be ousted 
from power, either by another internal coup or by a mass uprising of the people. 
5. The Need for Prospect Theory 
Neither diversionary war theory nor the junta’s critical misperception can 
independently explain the full spectrum of their actions. Arguments claiming less 
political security in 1978 or the junta’s strong grasp on power in 1982 are unconvincing. 
It is necessary to apply prospect theory to the scenarios in order to fully explain junta 
decisions. 
C. APPLICABILITY 
There have been very few major interstate wars in Latin America after the dawn 
of the twentieth century. Using Singer and Small’s generally accepted criteria of 1,000 
combat-related deaths, only the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia from 1932–
1935 met the definition of a true interstate war. The Falklands War was therefore the first 
real occurrence of interstate war in South America in fifty years, and provides a unique 
modern example. With no recent experience in waging external war, the junta did not 
seem to be capable of accurately estimating the costs of the conflict. Also, as has been 
discussed, a complete lack of interoperability between the military services was 
absolutely crippling to their combat effectiveness. Examining the causes of the war can 
give some useful insights that may help to explain why interstate war is so infrequent in 
the region.  
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1. Modern Territorial Conflicts 
Despite the relatively peaceful nature of modern international affairs,163 there are 
a significant number of unresolved territorial conflicts throughout the world, including 
several significant disputes in the Western Hemisphere. How could the lessons learned 
from this comparative case study of the Beagle Channel Conflict and the Falklands War 
be applicable to a broader range of territorial disputes?  
Could it be used to analyze and predict the likelihood of war in ongoing and 
future conflicts? Even such amicable neighbors as the United States and Canada have a 
number of unresolved disagreements regarding their mutual border, although the 
likelihood of any of these escalating into a MID is functionally non-existent. The 
question then becomes: are there similar situations that exist today to which the lessons of 
prospect theory in territorial disputes could be applied? According to prospect theory as 
applied to territorial disputes, the most critical factor to analyze would be whether the key 
decision-makers in a government feel that they are operating in the domain of gains or 
the domain of losses. Governments that seem to be operating in the domain of losses 
should be considered greater risks to take action against their territorial rivals. 
2. Accessible Information 
The greatest obstacle to this method of analysis lies in the fact that it can be 
highly difficult to accurately ascertain the actual mindset and thought process of key 
decision-makers without reliable first-hand knowledge. These powerful leaders typically 
feel that they would not benefit from full disclosure and transparency of their actions and 
intentions, which creates the desire for secrecy in governmental decision-making. Even 
the retelling of accounts well after the events in question can be suspect, since the people 
who are recounting the story generally have a vested interest in presenting themselves in 
a favorable light. This handicap does not render analysis impossible, but it does markedly 
increase the degree of difficulty.  
                                                
163 As measured by number of major interstate wars in Correlates of War, 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org. Accessed 7 September, 2011. 
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Therefore, studies such as this can only be conducted effectively for other 
territorial disputes if a reasonable amount of information regarding the decision-making 
process of key governmental leaders is available. If such information is obtainable, 
prospect theory could have significant explanatory value when examining historical 
conflicts, and also potentially assist in predicting the likelihood of other disputes 
escalating into war in the future. 
D. FURTHER STUDY 
This comparative study analyzed two cases of decisions made by a military junta. 
Due to the different factors in play, the characteristics of the decision-making process 
performed by a military junta may differ from what is undertaken by a government that is 
democratically elected. An interesting question for further study might be how prospect 
theory could be applied to cases in which a democratically elected government is 
weighing the potential gamble of a land grab. In any case, further study is needed to 
analyze the impact of prospect theory on territorial conflicts leading to militarized 
interstate disputes. 
Prospect theory should be strongly considered for future studies that seek to 
analyze the decision-making processes of governmental leaders. Because it is based on 
scientific studies in cognitive psychology, it can help to explain decisions that do not 
seem to fit the framework of rational choice. Human beings do not always act rationally, 
and those who occupy positions of power are no exception. Prospect theory can assist in 
efforts to determine why an action was taken, when a strictly rational analysis may have 
predicted another outcome. 
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